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Current research is beginning to question the role and effectiveness of traditional 
rules-based bank regulatory oversight in favor of incentive-compatible regulatory 
design and market discipline and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market 
discipline. However, research on the suitability of a mandatory subordinated debt 
policy (MSNDP) has focused primarily on the United States. The primary aims of 
this article, therefore, are to examine the market for subordinated debt (SND) issued 
by UK credit institutions and to assess the suitability of introducing an MSNDP 
into UK banking regulation. A further contribution of this article is that it explores 
SND issuance and its characteristics at a bank level and, uniquely, considers them 
in relation to regulatory, structural, and economic events that either are specific to 
the UK or otherwise affect international banks. The article compares the UK findings 
with research on SND markets in the United States and Europe and, in so doing, 
raises concerns over whether an MSNDP for the largest global credit institutions 
would be feasible. Although the focus of this study is the UK banking industry, the 
country-focused bank-level approach provides conclusions that might be relevant to 
other countries considering the implementation of an MSNDP. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Given that current debates on the future 
direction of bank regulatory design question the 
role and effectiveness of rules-based financial 
regulatory oversight, in favor of incentive- 
compatible regulatory design and market dis- 
cipline,  the  primary  objective  of  this  article 
is to assess the suitability of introducing a 
specific form of  market discipline, namely, a 
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mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSNDP), 
in UK banking. 
Accordingly, the article analyzes UK credit 
institutions’ subordinated debt (SND) issuance 
between January 1985 and December 2002 and 
relates  this  to  the  most  frequently  suggested 
MSNDP characteristics. Sironi (2001) is unique 
in exploring European (EU) banks’ SND issues 
(covering 17 countries); however, his pan-EU 
country-level  perspective  clouds  the  potential 
richness of  the  conclusions. For  example, he 
ignores building societies despite their ability 
to issue SND and their conversion to the same 
regulatory regime as UK banks. Moreover, his 
study indicates that over the data period, 21 UK 
banks have issued SND at  an  average of  10 
issues per issuer; however, only data on the 10 
largest are provided. 
An important contribution of this article is 
that it explores SND issues and their characteris- 
tics at a bank level and, also uniquely, considers 
them in relation to regulatory, structural, and 
economic  events  that  either  are  specific  to 
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the UK or affect international banks. This 
approach raises, inter alia, the following issues: 
how  have  SND  issues  and  their  characteris- 
tics  been  affected  by  the  introduction  of  the 
1988  Basel  Capital  Accord  and  the  Euro- 
currency? 
As a result, a number of important con- 
siderations, underpinning the proposals for an 
MSNDP, are investigated, and their impact on 
market discipline in the UK context, and inter- 
nationally, is examined. This raises a number 
of significant questions. For example, what, if 
at  all,  should  be  the  scope  and  structure  of 
an MSNDP? Although the focus of this study 
is the UK banking industry, the unique bank- 
level approach provides conclusions that may be 
equally relevant to other countries considering 
the introduction of an MSNDP. 
The article is split into five sections. Section 
II surveys the literature concerning market dis- 
cipline and explains the details underpinning 
proposals for mandatory SND market discipline. 
Sections III and IV examine the characteristics 
of UK credit institutions’ SND issues over the 
period 1985 – 2002. In  Section V,  these char- 
acteristics are analyzed in relation to MSNDP 
proposals. Section VI provides a summary of 
the main findings and draws conclusions that, 
inter  alia,  relate  to  the  implications  for  UK 
banks and bank regulation of implementing an 
MSNDP. 
 
 
II.   MANDATORY SND AND MARKET DISCIPLINE1 
 
A. Regulating Bank Behavior 
 
An increasingly important issue in the super- 
vision of credit institutions concerns the extent 
to which market investors can recognize and 
control bank risk taking (Bliss, 2001; Bliss and 
Flannery, 2001; Flannery, 2001; Hamalainen, 
Hall, and Howcroft, 2003). As the U.S. Depart- 
ment of the Treasury (1991) states: “In virtu- 
ally all of the discussions of financial system 
reform, a key topic is whether and how increased 
market  discipline  can  substitute  for  regula- 
tory discipline to redress some of the moral 
hazard and efficiency problems in banking.” 
Recent proposals from the United States (2000) 
and  the  European  Shadow  Financial  Regula- 
tory Committees (1999 and 2000), as well as 
 
 
1. Parts of this section summarize some key points and 
themes from Hamalainen (2004). Refer to that article for an 
expanded discussion. 
significant  research  by  the  Board  of  Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve System (2000) and 
Kwast  et  al.  (1999),  have  raised  the  profile 
of market discipline (in particular, mandatory 
SND market discipline) as a suitable regulatory 
policy.2 
Lane (1993) defines market discipline as fol- 
lows: “financial markets providing signals that 
lead borrowers (in this case, banks) to behave 
in a manner consistent with their solvency.” 
Accordingly, market discipline can be signaled 
by all three classes of private bank stakehold- 
ers: depositors, debt holders, and equity holders. 
Excessive risk taking by deposit-taking institu- 
tions  provides a  classic example of  the  mar- 
ket disciplinary process. Faced by increasing 
costs and greater uncertainty, depositors can 
either demand a higher return or withdraw their 
deposits. The threat of action, therefore, imposes 
discipline by signaling to deposit-taking institu- 
tions the riskiness of their activities. Similarly, 
debt holders can demand a higher yield on bank 
debt, thereby increasing the cost of funds for 
riskier institutions. Likewise, equity holders can 
sell their shares, thereby putting downward pres- 
sure on share prices and placing management 
under increased scrutiny. 
The literature discusses how there are two 
potential forms of market discipline: direct and 
indirect market discipline. Investors exert direct 
market discipline when a bank’s cost of issu- 
ing a financial instrument increases or its abil- 
ity to issue debt deteriorates with an increase 
in  its  risk  profile.  Indirect  market  discipline 
occurs when risk signals are used by interested 
parties to initiate disciplinary action on banks 
(Evanoff and Wall, 2001). For example, the reg- 
ulatory authorities might use the secondary mar- 
ket prices of uninsured liabilities or a bank’s 
inability to  issue new  uninsured debt  as  sig- 
nals to conduct more frequent examinations of 
banks where these market measures of risk have 
increased. 
Hamalainen (2004) discusses how SND hold- 
ers, in contrast to other bank stakeholders, are 
 
 
2. The international banking regulatory authorities them- 
selves have reacted to calls to enhance market discipline 
with the “Third Pillar” of the new Basel Capital Accord 
focusing on market discipline (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005). However, this pillar solely concentrates 
on improving bank disclosure, and although adequate and 
timely disclosure is a necessary condition for effective mar- 
ket discipline, it is not a sufficient condition on its own. 
Equally important is to create investors who consider them- 
selves at risk in the event of default, hence the proposals to 
introduce a mandatory SND requirement. 
 
 
best  placed to  satisfy a  two-stage framework 
for effective market discipline. As SND has no 
insurance, it  is  among the  first to  lose value 
in  the  event of  bank  failure. From  a  regula- 
tor’s perspective, SND provides the same cush- 
ioning effect to the deposit insurance scheme 
as  equity  but  without  the  risk-taking  incen- 
tive of equity holders. Furthermore, compared 
to certificates of deposit, the relatively long 
maturity  of  SND  limits  the  investor’s  ability 
to avoid sharing in the cost of failure. Under 
international banking regulations, credit insti- 
tutions can already voluntarily issue SND and 
include  it  as  part  of  their  regulatory  capital 
for solvency purposes.3 However, an MSNDP 
takes the argument one step further by sug- 
gesting that credit institutions must make reg- 
ular and large issues of SND in the market. 
Regular calls on the debt market will provide 
mandatory SND investors with a significant gov- 
ernance mechanism that is, by its nature, infre- 
quently applied by providers of equity finance.4 
These would subject credit institutions to fre- 
quent monitoring and direct discipline signaling. 
From an indirect perspective, regular mandatory 
debt issuance may create a liquid, deep, and sta- 
ble stock of securities in the secondary market, 
enhancing the quality of indirect discipline price 
information. 
Therefore, the aim of mandatory SND pro- 
posals was to create a significantly large class of 
financially sophisticated and uninsured investors 
who will be subject to loss if a bank becomes 
insolvent.  These  investors,  therefore,  would 
have a substantial financial incentive to monitor, 
accurately assess, and price bank risk. It fol- 
lows that they would signal and discipline bank 
risk taking and provide market signals to the 
regulatory authorities, thereby enhancing their 
disciplinary options. 
 
 
3. In line with international capital adequacy regulations, 
UK banks can currently hold up to 100% of Tier 1 capital in 
the form of Tier 2 capital. Tier 2 capital is composed of two 
elements: Upper Tier 2 (reserves, provisions, and perpetual 
SND) and lower Tier 2 (term SND). Credit institutions can 
hold  up  to  50%  of  Tier  1  capital in  the  form  of  lower 
Tier 2 term SND. Furthermore, institutions can hold Tier 
3 capital (term SND with a minimum original maturity of 2 
yr) to meet trading book exposures. However, in the United 
Kingdom, total Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital must not exceed 
Tier 1 capital. 
4. Data from the Basel Committee on Banking Super- 
vision (2003) confirm that large UK banks undertook only 
nine equity issues during the period 1990 – 2001. In contrast, 
there were 270 issues of SND by large UK banks between 
1989 and 2002. 
B. Mandatory SND Proposals 
 
Table 1 reproduces a table from Hamalainen 
(2004) summarizing mandatory SND proposals 
under key headings. A review of these pro- 
posals indicates a range of maturities from at 
least 1- and up to 5-yr initial term. The fre- 
quency of issuance ranges from semi-annual to 
quarterly issuance activity, with some propos- 
als recommending the percentage of debt that 
should mature each period. Finally, to leave a 
significant proportion of SND holders constantly 
exposed to the costs of failure, the amount of 
outstanding SND should typically be between 
2%  and  5%  of  an  institution’s  risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). In Section IV, these policy pro- 
posals are compared to the characteristics of UK 
credit institutions’ SND. 
Proponents of mandatory SND requirements 
recognize that there are limitations and costs 
attached to such a policy. Potential costs borne 
by banks may include costs associated with 
forced SND issuance, costs associated with a 
“second-best” capital structure, and costs asso- 
ciated with a possible reduction in funding 
options. The requirement to issue regular size- 
able amounts of SND may impose an excessive 
regulatory burden on smaller banking organi- 
zations. Therefore, some SND proposals agree 
that small banks should be exempt. For large 
banks, a key concern is whether an MSNDP 
would adjust bank capital structures from the 
unconstrained optimum, including crowding out 
equity capital. SND and equity provide a buffer 
against unexpected losses. But fundamentally, a 
bank with an insufficient magnitude of equity 
capital would provide shareholders with the 
incentive to invest in excessively risky projects 
because  the  project  risk  will  be  borne  pri- 
marily by debt holders and the deposit insur- 
ance  scheme.  Despite  debt  holders’  appear- 
ing to provide bank market disciplinary effects 
that are superior to equity capital, it is in the 
interests  of  debt  holders  to  ensure  that  the 
equity buffer does not become too low (Euro- 
pean  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Commit- 
tee,  2000).  To  ensure  that  an  MSNDP  does 
not force banks to lever themselves above the 
unconstrained optimum and crowd out other 
categories  of  funding,  proponents  of  manda- 
tory SND requirements recognize the need to 
restrict the level of SND that a bank would have 
to issue. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
A Summary of Mandatory SND Proposals 
 
Recognition Phase Criteria Control Phase Criteria 
 
Reference Debt Maturity Frequency of Issue Debt Size Additional Control Features 
 
Horvitz (1984, 
1987) 
x x ./ Discussed, but no 
specific details 
proposed 
./ Discusses the control 
characteristics of debt holder 
covenants, but no specific details 
proposed 
Benston et al. 
(1986) 
./ Discussed, but 
no specific details 
proposed 
./ Discussed, but no 
specific details 
proposed 
./ 3–5% of deposits ./ Covenants to restrict risky banks’ 
activities 
./ Some debt is puttable 
Keehn (1989) ./ Subordinated 
bonds would have 
maturities of 
greater than 5 yr 
./ Staggered to ensure 
debt maturity in any 1 
yr is greater than 10% 
but less than 20% of 
issued subordinated 
debt 
./ Minimum of 4% of 
subordinated debt to 
risk assets 
./ Progressively increased sanctions 
as a bank’s performance deteriorates 
(similar to the prompt corrective 
action provisions of FDICIA) 
Cooper and 
Fraser (1988) 
./ Should not be 
long term 
./ Rolled over at 
frequent intervals 
./ 3% of deposits ./ Bonds would be puttable at 95% 
of par 
./ Failure by the bank to repurchase 
within a prescribed period would 
trigger revocation of its charter 
Wall (1989) ./ Minimum 
maturity of 90 d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evanoff (1993)     ./ Long enough to 
tie debt holders to 
the bank (e.g., 5 
yr) 
./ Discussed, but no 
specific time period 
proposed 
 
 
 
 
 
./ Semi-annual calls 
on the market 
./ Minimum of 4–5% 
of RWA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
./ A significant 
proportion of total 
regulatory capital 
(e.g., 50%) 
./ Bonds would be puttable 
./ Exercise of put would force a bank 
to raise new debt or sell assets to 
meet debt size criteria within 90 d; 
otherwise, it would be deemed 
insolvent 
./ Restrictions on % of debt owned 
by insiders 
./ Progressively increased sanctions 
as a bank’s performance deteriorates 
(similar to the prompt corrective 
action provisions of FDICIA) 
./ Possible issue of puttable debt, the 
exercise of which would force a bank 
to raise new debt within 90 d; 
otherwise, it would be taken over by 
regulators 
Calomiris 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
Litan and 
Rauch (1997) 
x ./ Discusses the 
rollover of 
overlapping 
generations of debt, 
but no specific time 
period proposed 
./ At least 1 yr ./ A fraction due in 
each quarter 
./ 2% of nonreserve 
assets or 2% of RWA 
 
 
 
 
./ Minimum of 1–2% 
of RWA 
./ Debt yield would be restricted to 
50 basis points above a riskless rate 
./ “Insiders” excluded from holding 
sub debt 
 
 
x 
Bankers Round 
Table (1998) 
x x ./ Minimum of 2% of x 
liabilities 
Calomiris 
(1999) 
 
U.S. Shadow 
Financial 
Regulatory 
Committee 
(2000) 
./ 2 yr ./ 1/24th of the issue 
would mature each 
month 
./ At least 1 yr ./ At least 10% of debt 
would have to mature 
in each quarter 
./ Minimum of 2% of 
risky assets 
 
./ Minimum of 2% of 
risky assets 
./ Debt rates would be capped at a 
spread above treasury rates 
 
./ Progressively increased sanctions 
as a bank’s performance deteriorates 
(similar to the prompt corrective 
action provisions of FDICIA) 
./ Debt must be sold at arm’s length 
 
Continued 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Continued 
 
Recognition Phase Criteria Control Phase Criteria 
 
Reference Debt Maturity Frequency of Issue Debt Size Additional Control Features 
 
Evanoff and 
Wall (2001) 
./ 5 yr ./ Minimum two 
issues per year, with 
each issue at least 2 
mo apart 
./ Minimum of 3% of 
RWA 
./ Tie debt yields to the “trip wires” 
under prompt corrective action such 
that progressively increased sanctions 
are imposed as a bank’s performance 
deteriorates 
 
Note: Key: ./, issue considered; x, issue not considered; FDICIA, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Insurance Act. 
Source: Hamalainen (2004). 
 
 
III.   UK CREDIT INSTITUTIONS’ SND ISSUES 
1985 – 2002 
 
Sironi (2001) illustrates that, at the end of 
1999, SND issues by EU banks represented over 
46% of the world’s outstanding amount of bank 
SND. After France and Germany, the United 
Kingdom is one of the most active primary mar- 
kets for credit institution SND in Europe, and in 
value terms, it is the largest market in Europe.5 
Furthermore, 8 of the largest 23 EU banks by 
size of assets were United Kingdom owned (as 
at the end of 1999). An examination of one of 
the most active SND markets in Europe com- 
bined with a country-focused perspective, there- 
fore, provides an authoritative insight into the 
influences on issuance activity and a unique 
approach to assessing the appropriateness of an 
MSNDP. 
 
 
A. Methodology 
The literature provides two approaches to 
examining credit institution SND issuance activ- 
ity and characteristics. Covitz, Hancock, and 
Kwast (2004) estimate a probit model for the 
SND issuance decision by U.S. bank holding 
companies. They report that larger banking orga- 
nizations  are  more  likely  to  issue  SND  and 
those banks with poor supervisory ratings are 
less likely to issue SND during certain periods. 
An alternative approach is provided by Sironi 
(2001).  He  analyzes  EU  banks’  SND  issues 
using descriptive statistics to consider the design 
of an MSNDP. 
The authors investigated the creation of a 
probit issuance model, but it proved fundamen- 
tally difficult to construct in the UK context for 
 
 
5. See Sironi (2001) for EU-wide data that cover the 
period 1988 – 2000. 
two reasons. First, all previous studies applying 
this technique have been able to use quarterly 
accounting data. In the United Kingdom, these 
data can only be obtained on an annual basis, 
thereby severely restricting our sample size. Fur- 
thermore, combining a probit technique with 
annual data means that there would be insuf- 
ficient examples of when a UK credit institution 
has  not  issued SND  during a  year.  The  sec- 
ond issue is that the United Kingdom does not 
have enough credit institutions to create suffi- 
cient data points in the model, which could have 
been a way of overcoming the annual data prob- 
lem. Linked to this, it would be important to 
include the recessionary period 1989 – 1992 in a 
UK issuance decision model as this is the only 
time period that could provide some yearly data 
where individual banks have not issued SND. 
However, building societies have only been able 
to  issue  both  perpetual  and  term  SNDs  like 
banks since mid-1991, and so it would be inap- 
propriate to include building societies prior to 
this date as it was not a level playing field. 
Ignoring building societies for the 1989 – 1991 
time period would simply compound an already 
problematic sample size issue. 
Therefore, this study is in the spirit of the one 
conducted by Sironi (2001) in that it analyzes 
SND characteristics using descriptive statistics. 
However, it differs in two distinct ways. First, 
to answer the question posed in the title of the 
article, the SND data are compared with the 
desirable  MSNDP  characteristics proposed  in 
the literature. Second, this study focuses on one 
country and explores SND issuance and its char- 
acteristics at the bank level. As a result, it raises 
concerns that credit institution SND issuance is 
not as similar in different countries as the exist- 
ing literature suggests. 
 
 
 
B. Data Sources 
The research covers all SND issues by UK 
credit institutions over the period 1985 – 2002. 
This period was selected to cover the introduc- 
tion of the Basel Accord (at the end of 1989 
in the United Kingdom) and also to capture a 
period of particular difficulty for UK credit insti- 
tutions in the aftermath of the Latin American 
debt crisis and the domestic recession of the 
early 1990s. The details of the SND issues were 
obtained from the Bondware database, which 
was  supported  by  balance  sheet  information 
from Bankscope and credit ratings information 
from Moody’s. 
 
 
C. Issuance Activity 
Table 2  outlines  the  general  characteristics 
of UK credit institutions’ SND issues over the 
sample  period  1985 – 2002.  The  total  number 
of issues between January 1985 and December 
2002 was 390, that is, an average of  22 per 
year. However, this hides periods of markedly 
different issuance activity. For example, there 
was a sharp increase in the number of SND 
issues  after  1998  (average  of  46  issues  per 
year). Equally, between 1985 and 1998, the 
average value of SND issues was $3,783 million 
per  year.  However,  from  1999  onwards,  this 
rises significantly, culminating in an average for 
the past 4 yr of $19,115 million per year. No 
building societies issued SND until 1988 as they 
were restricted from doing so until the passing of 
the Building Societies Act 1986.6  Nevertheless, 
the  period  1989 – 1992  indicates  a  period  of 
reduced issuance activity both in the number of 
issues (average of 10 per year) and total value of 
issues (average of $2,008 per year). The period 
1993 – 1998 was fairly stable with the number of 
issues ranging from 14 to 26 per year and the 
value of issues ranging from $3,332 – $7,320. 
The large rise in issues after 1998 can be 
explained by a number of factors. The introduc- 
tion of the euro in 1999, for example, appears 
to  have  had  a  significant  influence  on  issu- 
ing  activity.  The  Bank  for  International  Set- 
tlements (2000) suggests that structural factors 
are the primary reason for the surge in euro- 
denominated debt in 1999, in particular the sig- 
nificant expansion in the investor base and the 
portfolio diversification opportunities presented 
 
 
6. Five building societies brought issues to the market 
during that year, and four of them were in the group of the 
six largest societies as at the end of 1987. 
to investors. However, Table 3 also illustrates 
that the growth in sterling and U.S. dollar- 
denominated  issues  was  equally  spectacular. 
This suggests that it was favorable debt mar- 
ket conditions that prompted the large growth 
in SND issues by UK credit institutions after 
1998. The period was marked by a reduction in 
the supply of government debt issuance, which 
led investors to search for highly rated issuers 
as substitutes for benchmark pricing.7  As a 
result, when yield spreads increased during this 
period, although the number of high-yield issues 
reduced, investors found high-quality corporate 
bonds a suitable substitute for the lack of gov- 
ernment instruments (Bank for International Set- 
tlements, 2001). Moreover, the sharp correction 
in the equity markets from 2000 onwards has 
made the issuance of equity instruments less 
attractive and further encouraged the shift of 
excess funds into debt instruments. As a result, 
the  private  sector  has  probably  responded  to 
the new availability of funds by issuing record 
amounts of debt. In addition, the global eco- 
nomic slowdown and the consequent reduction 
in the demand for industrial working capital, 
combined with the historically low long-term 
yields, have encouraged borrowers to extend the 
maturity of their debt (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2002). Table 5 illustrates a signifi- 
cant rise in perpetual SND issues over the period 
1999 – 2002, suggesting that such a policy was 
particularly evident in the United Kingdom. 
The  low  SND  issuance  over  the  period 
1989 – 1992 also appears to reflect the state of 
the debt market and the general economic cli- 
mate during that period. The Bank of England 
(1991) stated at the time that “unfavourable mar- 
ket conditions allowed only a small number of 
SND issues to be eligible for inclusion in the 
capital base.” A tightening of monetary policy 
had led to historically high long-term interest 
rates. Moreover, the wholesale funding markets 
were nervous because of the Middle East con- 
flict, the financial pressures on smaller UK banks 
following the closure of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) and British and 
Commonwealth Merchant  Bank  (Hall,  1999), 
and  the  UK’s  uncertain  position  with  regard 
to the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). The 
severe domestic recession around this time also 
led to a period of low growth in new business 
 
 
7. All UK credit institutions that have issued SND have 
current Moody’s Financial Strength Ratings of C and above, 
with nearly all banks in the Category B. 
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TABLE 2 
UK Credit Institutions’ SND Issues by Year (1985 – 2002) 
 
Fixed-Rate Issues Perpetual Issues Callable Issues 
 
 
Year 
No. of 
Issues 
No. of 
Issuers 
Average/ 
Issuer 
 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Amount 
($m) 
% of 
Total 
  
No. 
% of 
Total 
Amount 
($m) 
% of 
Total 
  
No. 
% of 
Total 
Amount 
($m) 
% of 
Total 
Average First 
Call Date (yr) 
SD 
(yr) 
1985 15 9 1.67 0 0.0 0 0.0  13 86.7 6,190 92.6  15 100.0 6,685 100.0 5 1 
1986 10 6 1.67 1 10.0 244 7.2  6 60.0 2,450 71.9  9 90.0 3,164 92.8 5 0 
1987 4 3 1.33 2a 66.6 847a 75.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 50.0 546 42.9 6 6 
1988 23 10 2.30 9 39.1 1,762 40.3  1 4.3 350 8.0  13 56.5 2,219 50.7 5 0 
1989 13 8 1.63 2 15.4 288 10.3  4 30.8 1,501 53.9  9 69.2 2,351 84.5 5 0 
1990 6 6 1.00 3 50.0 750 48.3  1 16.7 514 33.1  3 50.0 804 51.7 7 3 
1991 9 7 1.29 5a 62.5 1,235a 87.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 44.4 676 46.6 5 4 
1992 13 10 1.30 11 84.6 2,128 94.9  1 7.7 304 13.6  5 38.5 893 39.8 16 11 
1993 24 13 1.85 21a 91.3 4,523a 92.8  9 37.5 2,091 39.7  11 45.8 3,049 58.0 11 7 
1994 14 8 1.75 9a 75.0 2,670a 84.6 4 28.6 590 17.7 5 35.7 1,124 33.7 8 3 
1995 18 8 2.25 13 72.2 3,068 79.2  8 44.4 1,425 36.8  7 38.9 1,074 27.7 11 7 
1996 26 14 1.86 22 84.6 6,554 89.5  8 30.8 1,914 26.1  14 53.8 3,380 46.2 10 6 
1997 17 11 1.55 11 64.7 3,446 66.8  7 41.2 1,971 38.2  11 64.7 3,241 62.8 10 6 
1998 15 8 1.88 14 93.3 4,160 96.7  4 26.7 972 22.6  7 46.7 1,551 36.1 14 10 
1999 54 15 3.60 40 74.1 16,456 80.0  19 35.2 6,229 30.3  28 51.9 8,979 43.7 10 8 
2000 47 14 3.36 40 85.1 17,927 91.2  32 68.1 15,970 81.3  37 78.7 17,467 88.9 13 7 
2001 39 12 3.25 36 92.3 15,784 96.2  25 64.1 10,420 63.5  27 69.2 11,552 70.4 15 9 
2002 43 11 3.91 33 76.7 17,948 90.5  17 39.5 10,102 50.9  30 69.8 12,807 64.6 14 9 
Total    390 235 70.6 90,515 72.4 159 40.8 62,993 48.7 237 60.8 81,562 63.0 10.7 7.7 
 
Note: Average issues/yr 22. 
a Data were not available for all issues in that year; hence, the percentages do not equate exactly with the total number (and value) of issues reported in this table. 
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TABLE 3 
UK Credit Institutions’ Annual SND Issues by Currency Denomination (1985 – 2002) 
 
Amount ($m) Amount by currency ($m equivalent)a 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
No. of 
Issues Amount   Mean GBP US$ Yen DM FFR LFR DFL LIT 
 
Euro 
Currency 
Total Euro SFR HKG$ C$ 
 
1985 15 6,685   445.7 285 (2) 6, 400 (13) — — — — — — — — — — — 
1986 10 3,408   340.8 582 (2) 2, 450 (6) 244 (1) 132 (1) 132 (1) — — — — 
1987 4 1,272   318.0 447 (1) 680 (2) — — 146 (1) — — — 146 (1) — — — — 
1988 23 4,376   190.3   2, 747 (17) 1, 450 (5) — 179 (1) — — — — 179 (1) — — — — 
1989 13 2,783   214.1   1, 342 (6) 1, 300 (5) 38 (1) 104 (1) — — — — 104 (1) — — — — 
1990 6 1,554   259.0   1, 286 (4) 250 (1) — — — 18 (1) — — 18 (1) — — — — 
1991 9 1,452   161.3 952 (8) 500 (1) — — — — — — — — — — — 
1992 13 2,242   172.5   2, 007 (9) 75 (1) — — — 47 (2)    113 (1) — 160 (3) — — — — 
1993 24 5,261   219.2   3, 673 (19) 1, 200 (4) — — — — — — — — — 388 (1) — 
1994 14 3,332   238.0   2, 056 (9) 1, 100 (3) — — — — — — — — 102 (1) — 75 (1) 
1995 18 3,874   215.2   2, 217 (13) 1, 434 (4) 224 (1) — — — — — — — — — — 
1996 26 7,320   281.5   4, 600 (16) 2, 150 (7) 340 (2) 230 (1) — — — — 230 (1) — — — — 
1997 17 5,160   303.5   4, 360 (15) 800 (2) — — — — — — — — — — — 
1998 15 4,300   286.7   1, 263 (4) 950 (3) 63 (1) 964 (3)    328 (2) — — 140 (1)  1, 432 (6) 592 (1) — — — 
1999 54 20,568   380.9   4, 327 (17) 8, 275 (19) — — — — — — — 7, 966 (18) — — — 
2000 47 19,654   418.2   7, 761 (26) 8, 275 (13) — — — — — — — 3, 617 (8) — — — 
2001 39 16,409   420.7   6, 344 (22) 5, 125 (9) 352 (1) — — — — — — 4, 588 (7) — — — 
2002 43   19,830   461.2   8, 250 (19) 6, 800 (14) — — — — — — — 4, 779 (10) — — — 
Total   390 129,480   332.0 54, 499 (209)  49, 214 (112)    1, 261 (7)  1, 609 (7)    474 (3) 65 (3)    113 (1)    140 (1)  2, 401 (15)  2, 1542 (44)    102 (1)    388 (1)  75 (1) 
Average issue size 
(by currency) 
261 439 180 230 158 22 113 140 160 490 102 388 75 
 
GBP, British pounds; DM, deutsche mark; FFR, French franc; LFR, Luxembourg franc; DFL, Dutch florin; LIT, Italian lira; SFR, Swiss franc; HKG, Hong Kong dollar; C, Canadian 
dollar. 
a In parentheses are the number of issues in that currency during the year. 
Source: Bondware. 
  
 
Year <5 Yr    5 Yr    5–10 Yr   10 Yr   10–15 Yr  15 Yr  15–20 Yr  20 Yr  >20 Yr  Perpetuals  Total 
Average 
Initial 
Maturityb 
 
1985 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 13 15 17.5 
1986 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 10 11.75 
1987 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 15.0 
1988 0 0 0 16 1 2 0 1 2 1 23 12.38 
1989 0 0 0 2 1 4 1 1 0 4 13 14.62 
1990 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 9.4 
1991 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 1 2 0 9 15.6 
1992 0 0 1 7 0 1 1 0 2 1 13 13.83 
1993 0 0 2 3 0 2 0 1 7 9 24 18.63 
1994 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 1 4 14 12.6 
1995 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 0 2 8 18 12.94 
1996 0 0 0 7 1 6 1 0 3 8 26 14.47 
1997 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 1 7 17 13.73 
1998 2 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 3 4 15 13.01 
1999 2 0 0 15 10 1 0 3 4 19 54 12.84 
2000 0 0 0 6 4 1 1 1 2 32 47 12.87 
2001 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 6 25 39 19.1 
2002 0 0 0 9 8 3 1 3 2 17 43 13.76 
Total 4 (1) 2 (1/2) 5 (1) 97 (25) 34 (9) 33 (9) 6 (2) 12 (3) 38 (10) 159(41) 390 14.03 
 
a In parentheses is the percentage of the total number of issues. 
b Excluding perpetual issues. 
Source: Bondware. 
 
activity, a rise in bad debt problems, and 
pressure on profit margins, which led banks to 
focus on improving the efficiency of their opera- 
tions. The Bank of England (1990) stated, “With 
income growth from traditional business ever 
more difficult to achieve, there was a continuing 
emphasis on cost control, and on less capital- 
intensive, fee-based income sources.” This, in 
turn, may have dampened the supply of new 
capital issues. The Bank of England (1990) also 
reported, “A  number of  banks have disposed 
of assets in order to improve their [capital] 
ratios.” A further explanation could be that in 
attempting to meet the Basel Accord conver- 
gence criteria, EU bank SND issues increased 
significantly from 1988 onwards. As a result, the 
stock of SND in the international capital mar- 
kets could have caused an oversupply that may 
have deterred UK credit institutions, which were 
already meeting the Basel criteria, from issuing 
further debt. 
A consequence of banks, appearing to access 
SND markets when conditions are favorable is 
that it may provide a bias in studies that examine 
 
market discipline through primary market yield 
spread data. 
 
 
D. Maturity Characteristics 
UK credit institutions typically issue perpet- 
ual debt or debt that has an initial maturity of 
just greater than 10 or 15 yr. In contrast, the 
issuance of SND with an initial maturity of less 
than 10 yr has been very infrequent over the 
sample period (Tables 4 – 6). These tables illus- 
trate that perpetual debt issues are extremely fre- 
quent in the United Kingdom, representing 41% 
of all issues over the sample period and 49% of 
the total value of SND issues (Table 2). This is 
high compared to that of other EU countries.8 
Table 5 breaks the issuance data into the peri- 
ods of distinct issuance activity discussed above 
and highlights that, between 1985 and 1988, 
perpetual debt was significant along with 10- 
yr issues (both maturities representing 78% of 
 
8. Sironi (2001) illustrates that, between 1988 and 2000, 
perpetual issues in France represented only 7% of all SND 
issues and in Germany 2% of all issues. 
 1999 – 2002  2 (1%)  0 (0%) 0 (0%)  32 (17%)  27 (15%)   6 (3%) 2 (1%)  7 (4%)    14 (8%) 93 (51%) 183 14.09 
Total 4 (1%)  2 (1/2%) 5 (1%)  97 (25%)  34 (9%)    33 (9%) 6 (2%)  12 (3%)  38 (10%) 159 (41%) 390 14.03 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
SND Maturity Characteristics for Periods of Years 
 
 
Year 
<5 
Yr 
5 
Yr 
5–10 
Yr 
10 
Yr 
10–15 
Yr 
15 
Yr 
15–20 
Yr 
20 
Yr 
>20 
Yr 
 
Perpetuals Total  Av.m 
 
1985 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
13 
 
15 
1986 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 10 
1987 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
1988 0 0 0 16 1 2 0 1 2 1 23 
1985 – 1988  0 (0%)  0 (0%) 0 (0%)  21 (40%)   2 (4%) 4 (8%)   0 (0%)  2 (4%) 3 (6%) 20 (38%) 52 12.95 
1989 0 0 0 2 1 4 1 1 0 4 13 
1990 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
1991 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 1 2 0 9 
1992 0 0 1 7 0 1 1 0 2 1 13 
1989 – 1992  0 (0%)  1 (2%) 2 (5%)  15 (37%)   2 (5%) 7 (17%) 2 (5%)  2 (5%) 4 (10%) 6 (15%) 41 13.86 
1993 0 0 2 3 0 2 0 1 7 9 24 
1994 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 1 4 14 
1995 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 0 2 8 18 
1996 0 0 0 7 1 6 1 0 3 8 26 
1997 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 1 7 17 
1998 2 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 3 4 15 
1993 – 1998  2 (2%)  1 (1%) 3 (3%)  29 (25%)   3 (3%)    16 (14%) 2 (2%)  1 (1%)    17 (15%)   40 (35%)  114 14.53 
1999 2 0 0 15 10 1 0 3 4 19 54 
2000 0 0 0 6 4 1 1 1 2 32 47 
2001 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 6 25 39 
2002 0 0 0 9 8 3 1 3 2 17 43 
 
 
 
Av.m, average initial maturity. 
Source: Bondware. 
 
all SND issues). The large number of perpetual 
debt issues in 1985 and 1986 reflect the fact that, 
as of May 1985, the Bank of England accepted 
floating rate perpetual debt as “primary capital” 
(Hall, 1999).9 However, when total SND issues 
waned (1989 – 1992), the proportion of perpet- 
ual debt dropped significantly, presumably in 
response to the historically high long-term inter- 
est rates discussed above. In contrast, 10-yr 
bonds remained important, and there was an 
increase in 15-yr benchmark bonds. However, 
when long-term interest rates began to fall, the 
period 1993 – 1998 saw perpetual debt, together 
with 10-yr bonds, becoming the most common 
maturities for SND issues. As total SND issues 
increased significantly during 1999 – 2002, the 
overriding  preference  was  to  take  advantage 
of historically low long-term interest rates and 
issue perpetual debt (51% of all issues and 56% 
of the value of all issues were perpetuals). Dur- 
ing this period, the issuance of 10- and 15-yr 
 
 
9. It is clear from the data that, from May 1, 1985, all 
perpetual debt issues for the next 2 yr were floating rate 
issues. 
benchmarks was replaced by debt with a matu- 
rity of between 10 and 15 yr. 
Table 6 looks at the maturity characteristics 
of bonds issued pre and post the introduction 
of the Basel Capital Accord. The United King- 
dom moved immediately to implement the Basel 
convergence agreement at the end of December 
1989, and therefore the table has been divided 
to reflect domestic policy. This shows that there 
has been a movement post the Basel Accord 
to  issue  bonds  across  the  maturity  spectrum, 
but in general, the Basel Accord has had lit- 
tle effect on UK SND issues with nearly all still 
being equal to or in excess of 10 yr in matu- 
rity. The final columns in Tables 4 – 6 appear to 
confirm the apparent unimportance of the Basel 
Accord on UK SND maturities. They indicate 
that the average initial maturity of nonperpet- 
ual debt issues has not shifted significantly over 
the period 1985 – 2002. What is of note, how- 
ever, is that the introduction of the Capital Ade- 
quacy Directive in 1996 has given rise to some 
shorter-dated issues (although they are still very 
small in number), which can be used as Tier 3 
capital. The apparent unimportance of the Basel 
   
<5 
 
5 
 
5–10 
 
10 
 
10–15 
 
15 
 
15–20 
 
20 
 
>20 
Average 
Initial 
Year Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Perpetuals Total Maturity 
 
1985 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
13 
 
15 
1986 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 6 10 
1987 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
1988 0 0 0 16 1 2 0 1 2 1 23 
1989 0 0 0 2 1 4 1 1 0 4 13 
1985 – 1989 0 (0%) 0 (0%)    0 (0%) 23 (35%)   3 (5%) 8 (12%) 1 (2%)   3 (5%)   3 (5%) 24 (37%)  65 13.32 
1990 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
1991 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 1 2 0 9 
1992 0 0 1 7 0 1 1 0 2 1 13 
1993 0 0 2 3 0 2 0 1 7 9 24 
1994 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 1 4 14 
1995 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 0 2 8 18 
1996 0 0 0 7 1 6 1 0 3 8 26 
1997 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 1 7 17 
1998 2 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 3 4 15 
1999 2 0 0 15 10 1 0 3 4 19 54 
2000 0 0 0 6 4 1 1 1 2 32 47 
2001 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 6 25 39 
2002 0 0 0 9 8 3 1 3 2 17 43 
1990 – 2002 4 (1%) 2 (1%)    5 (2%) 74 (23%) 31 (10%) 25 (8%)   5 (2%)   9 (3%) 35 (11%)  135 (42%) 325 14.19 
Total 4 (1%) 2 (1/2%) 5 (1%) 97 (25%) 34 (9%)   33 (9%)   6 (2%) 12 (3%) 38 (10%)  159 (41%) 390 14.03 
 
Source: Bondware. 
 
 
Accord on UK SND maturities contrasts with 
the findings of Sironi (2001), who indicated that, 
since the Basel Accord came into effect, there 
has been a significant increase in the number of 
issues with a maturity equal to or in excess of 
10 yr. A possible explanation for this is that the 
classification of capital under the Basel Accord 
did not represent a significant departure from 
the UK capital adequacy regime prior to the 
Accord.10 As a result, UK banks appear to have 
been issuing SND with sufficiently long matu- 
rities (before the 5-yr amortization rule would 
apply) for some time. 
 
 
E. Issue Size 
Between 1988 and 1996, the mean value of 
each issue was generally less than $200 million 
in real terms, but since 1991, the mean value has 
been on a distinctly upward trend, reaching its 
highest value in 2002 (Table 7). Moreover, there 
was a high percentage of smaller issues between 
 
 
10. See Hall (1999) for details on the UK capital 
adequacy assessment regime prior to the Basel Accord. 
1988 and 1995. From 1999 to 2002, the growth 
in the number of issues was accompanied by 
the first ever $1 billion plus (in nominal terms) 
issue. Fourteen such large-scale issues occurred 
in this 4-yr period, and 11 of these were 
denominated  in  US$  and  9  were  perpetual 
bonds. The fact that demand for large issues 
had clearly increased in 1999 (the next-largest 
issue in  nominal terms, at  $809 million, had 
been made 7 yr earlier in 1992) suggests that 
this was a period of strong investor demand for 
high-quality corporate SND. Table 7 illustrates 
how the rise in the number of debt issues from 
1999 onwards was accompanied by a growth 
in large issues. Rather interesting are the low 
minimum issue sizes, in the years 1999 – 2002, 
which  are  all  attributed  to  the  entrance  of 
smaller building societies into the SND market. 
This development provides further evidence that 
demand was high during this period. 
 
F. Currency of Issue 
The preferred currency of issue has clearly 
been sterling and U.S. dollars throughout the 
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TABLE 7 
Analysis of Dispersion of Issue Size of UK Credit Institutions’ SND in Real Terms (1985 – 2002) 
 
Amount ($m) Number of Issues Between ($m) 
 
Year Total Mean Minimun Maximun SD <100 100 – 199 200 – 299 300 – 399 400 – 499 500 – 599 600 – 699 700 – 799 800 – 899 No. of Issues 
 
1985 6,547 436 93 737 179 1 1 1 4 5 1 — 2 — 15 
1986 3,283 328 128 722 189 — 3 3 2 — 1 — 1 — 10 
1987 1,167 292 137 409 122 — 1 1 1 1 — — — — 4 
1988 3,902 170 62 438 94 7 11 2 2 1 — — — — 23 
1989 2,361 182 33 463 155 7 1 2 1 2 — — — — 13 
1990 1,240 207 15 418 169 2 2 — 1 1 — — — — 6 
1991 1,124 125 32 389 115 5 2 1 1 — — — — — 9 
1992 1,686 130 13 609 157 7 4 1 — — — 1 — — 13 
1993 3,847 160 53 366 82 6 10 7 1 — — — — — 24 
1994 2,378 170 11 429 127 4 6 1 2 1 — — — — 14 
1995 2,676 149 54 515 103 4 10 3 — — 1 — — — 18 
1996 4,923 189 102 414 88 — 16 5 4 1 — — — — 26 
1997 3,400 200 107 329 78 — 10 3 4 — — — — — 17 
1998 2,784 186 41 380 97 2 8 2 3 — — — — — 15 
1999 13,018 241 5 828 178 14 10 12 9 5 — 3 — 1 54 
2000 12,072 257 15 831 185 9 14 12 4 2 2 2 1 1 47 
2001 9,766 250 21 713 176 10 6 11 3 3 5 — 1 — 39 
2002 11,602 270 13 816 198 12 6 9 5 6 3 1 — 1 43 
Total 87,776 225 5 828 164 90 121 76 47 28 13 7 5 3 390 
 
Source: Bondware. 
 sample period (Table 3). The advent of the Euro 
gave rise to a number of issues in displaced 
domestic EU currencies during 1998. However, 
the introduction of the euro in 1999 subse- 
quently led to its becoming the third most impor- 
tant currency of issue for UK SND issues. In 
1999, euro issues even outstripped those issued 
in sterling, but from 2000 onwards, the supply 
of euro issues has fallen behind those issued in 
sterling and dollars. This suggests that, perhaps, 
the 1999 increase in Euro issues reflected the 
novelty value of the currency. However, as the 
euro weakened against sterling, its attractiveness 
as a base currency for SND issues declined. As 
previously discussed, it is important to note that 
the sudden rise in SND issues in 1999 cannot be 
solely attributed to the introduction of the euro, 
as both sterling and dollar issues rose signifi- 
cantly at this time. 
It is also interesting to note that, although 
the number of euro issues declined, Table 3 indi- 
cates that the average size of issues denominated 
in dollars and euros are generally much larger 
than their sterling SND counterparts.11 This sug- 
gests that they are probably easier to sell in large 
amounts compared to their sterling equivalent. 
 
 
G. Fixed-Rate Issues 
The percentage of fixed-rate issues, shown in 
Table 2, illustrates a clear trend toward this type 
of finance from 1992 onwards. This transition 
coincided with the general expectation, around 
that time, that future interest rates would come 
down as a result of the anti-inflationary policies 
of the monetary authorities. Furthermore, from 
1992 onwards, the percentage of fixed-rate debt 
typically remained between 70% and 90% of 
total issues. 
 
 
H. Callable Issues 
UK credit institutions frequently attach call 
features to their SND, and this has been par- 
ticularly true for issues since 2000. The sample 
period average of 61% is broadly in line with 
Sironi’s (2001) observation that UK credit insti- 
tutions are one of the highest issuers of callable 
SND in Europe. This finding is probably not that 
surprising given the high proportion of perpetual 
debt issues made in the United Kingdom. It is 
 
 
11. For the period 1999 – 2002, the average issue size is 
$317 million for sterling-denominated issues, $518 million 
for U.S. dollar ones, and $487 million for euro ones. 
also interesting to note that about 90% of 
perpetual debt issues have callable features, 
whereas for nonperpetual debt, the figure is 
40%. The average first call date over the 
sample period is 10 yr, but the standard 
deviation highlights significant variation. In any 
year, the first call date typically ranges from 5 
to 25 yr. Table 2 also highlights how the 
average first call date has lengthened over time 
from 5 to 14 yr.12 
 
 
I. Convertible Issues 
The Bondware data analyzed in this article 
exclude convertible SND issues but, in line with 
Sironi’s (2001) observations for the whole EU 
SND market, the United Kingdom has witnessed 
only 22 convertible SND issues over the period 
1985 – 2002, representing only 5% of all issues. 
 
 
J. Spread at Launch 
This information is only available for issues 
since 1991, and of the 258 fixed-rate issues 
during that time, information on primary spreads 
is available for 205 of them (80%). The evidence 
is presented in Table 8 and highlights an average 
spread over comparable treasury instruments of 
150 basis points, with a standard deviation of 
70  basis  points.  Even  during  the  exceptional 
issuance period 1998 – 2002, the average spread 
at launch was 176 basis points and the standard 
deviation was 73 basis points. To impose a 
penalty on highly risky banks, Calomiris (1997) 
suggested that qualifying debt should not exceed 
a yield spread of 50 basis points. In the UK 
context,  such  a  policy  would  have  resulted 
in only five issues being unpenalized between 
1991 and 2002.13 Equally, the variability of UK 
spreads suggests that imposing and determining 
an optimal rate cap for qualifying SND would 
be difficult. 
 
 
K. Issue Method 
The type of market issue can provide some 
indication  as  to  whether  the  market  for  UK 
 
12. An area for further research is the frequency with 
which issues are called and whether they are immediately 
replaced with new debt issues. 
13. Four of the five issues occur in the years 1996 – 1998, 
which Table 5 illustrates is a period of markedly reduced 
issuance spreads. We  ascribe  the  lower  spreads  in  these 
years to general market conditions as Sironi (2001) shows 
a similar, although less pronounced, pattern for EU banks’ 
SND. 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Spread at Launch Characteristics by Year 
(1991 – 2002)a 
TABLE 9 
UK Credit Institutions’ SND Issues by Issue 
Method (1985 – 2002) 
 
 
No. of 
Spread at Launch (Basis Points)  
No. of 
 
% of 
Total 
Amount % of 
Average 
Issue 
Year Issues  Mean  Median  Maximun  Minimum  SD Issue Method Issues Total ($m) Total Size 
 
1991 4 163 166 185 135 19 
1992 7 138 152 235 37 57 
1993 20 145 140 280 90 37 
1994 8 126 100 240 63 64 
1995 10 134 140 230 62 56 
1996 19 90 91 185 11 34 
1997 10 99 85 225 55 46 
 
1999 28 141 146 240 72 43 
2000 37 245 240 415 112 66 
2001 27 165 150 288 87 56 
2002 23 124 109 225 70 40 
Total    205 150 135 415 11 71 
 
a These data are only available for 205 fixed-rate issues 
and only for issues after 1990. 
Source: Bondware. 
 
Domestic – 
Public Issue 
Euro  – Public 
Issue 
Foreign – Public 
Issue 
Global – Public 
 
 
 
Domestic – 
Private 
Placement 
 
Placement 
Foreign – 
Private 
Placement 
 
15 3.8 1,827 1.4    121.8 
 
309 79.2   101,829    78.6    329.5 
 
29 7.4 13,063    10.1    450.4 
 
13 3.3 9,212 7.1    708.6 
 
366 93.7   125,931   97.3    344.1 
 
1 0.3 81 0.1 81.0 
 
 
 
 
6 1.5 1,595 1.2    265.8 
 
 
24 6.2 3,551 2.7    148.0 
 
SND would be able to support a suitable 
MSNDP. Although both public and private plac- 
ing of SND issues may provide suitable direct 
discipline,14  public issuance is viewed as a 
necessary condition to create suitable depth in 
secondary markets and, therefore, the potential 
for successful indirect market discipline (Basel 
Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  2003).15 
As  Table 9  indicates,  the  average  issue  size 
of  public  issues  far  outweighs  that  for  pri- 
vate placements. Similarly, the majority of SND 
issues (94%)  are  public  and  the  dollar  value 
of these issues represents 97% of total SND 
value. The vast majority of these public issues 
are Eurobonds, with 79% of all SND issues 
being euro –  public issues. These percentages 
far  exceed  those  presented  by  Sironi  (2001). 
As such, they serve to highlight the existence 
 
 
14. The price at which a public issue is taken to market 
should provide a strong indication of investors’ perceived 
risks for that issuer; however, with private placements, it is 
less certain if sufficient scrutiny of the issuer takes place. 
15. It must be remembered that, although large public 
issues raise the opportunity for liquid secondary markets, if 
bond investors simply “buy and hold” SND in their portfo- 
lios, such issues will be illiquid and therefore result in mis- 
leading secondary market signals. Therefore, it is important 
to understand investors’ motivations for purchasing SND 
(both in public issues and in private placements) and whether 
they regularly monitor institutions’ risk taking and, thus, 
reflect this in secondary prices. The authors are currently 
researching this behavioral aspect to market discipline. 
 
Total                        390    100.0   129,482  100.0    332.0 
 
Source: Bondware. 
 
of structural differences across the EU SND 
markets and suggest that some countries’ bank 
issues may be better placed to support price- 
based indirect market discipline than others. 
 
 
IV.   BANK AND BUILDING SOCIETIES’ INDIVIDUAL 
ISSUANCE 
 
A. Activity 
Unlike other studies on EU market discipline, 
this article has purposefully incorporated two 
types of domestic credit institutions to assess 
whether the market for SND is sufficiently deep 
to include issues from both types of institutions 
in an MSNDP. As financial regulatory policy 
in the UK converges for both forms of credit 
institutions, it is important to see if an MSNDP 
could affect the level playing field. 
The 390 SND issues by UK credit institutions 
over the sample period relate to 34 different 
issuers (pre-mergers), of which 21 were (and 
some still are) building societies. By the end 
of  2002,  mergers  and  takeovers  had  reduced 
the number of issuers to 23, of which 12 were 
banks. This means that 11 of the 65 currently 
registered building societies have issued SND. 
 
 
 
A  brief  examination reveals that  10  of  these 
have  assets  in  excess  of  £1,000  million  and 
7 represent the largest UK building societies. 
With regard to  the  banks, an  examination of 
the  94  UK-owned banks (as  at  March 2001) 
reveals that 11 SND issuers were in the top 12 
banks, as measured by total assets, and all 12 
were among the 15 largest banks in the United 
Kingdom. This concentration of SND issuance 
highlights that a lot of smaller UK banks and 
building societies do not issue SND, and so an 
MSNDP would have to be restricted to the larger 
UK credit institutions. The question, however, is 
whether such a policy would be appropriate for 
even these institutions. 
Some commentators have suggested that 
because banks issue more SND than the 25% 
of capital that is permitted for capital adequacy 
purposes  under  the  Basel  Accord,  a  manda- 
tory issuance policy structured on current capital 
ratios should not constrain banks’ funding possi- 
bilities. However, they fail to recognize that only 
term SND is limited to 25% of regulatory cap- 
ital. Perpetual SND can be included, for capital 
adequacy purposes, up to a maximum of 50% of 
regulatory capital. This is important because this 
article has already stressed how perpetual SND 
forms a significant proportion of UK issues. 
Therefore, although column 7 in Table A1 sug- 
gests that all large UK banks have outstanding 
SND in excess of 25% of regulatory capital, it 
is all likely to be included for regulatory cap- 
ital purposes. Consequently, regulatory capital 
regulations may  be  having  a  larger  influence 
on the type of SND being issued than is cur- 
rently recognized in the literature. For example, 
51% of all SND issues in the growth period of 
1999 – 2002 were perpetual issues, and these rep- 
resented 56% of the total value of issues during 
this 4-yr period. 
Table A1 provides a list of the largest UK 
banks and building societies as at the end of 
2002 together with SND issuance data and key 
balance sheet information. Although all 10 large 
banks have reasonable amounts of SND out- 
standing when compared to RWA,16  Table A1 
highlights a concentration of SND issuance 
among the six largest credit institutions. These 
six  institutions  issued  312  of  the  390  issues 
made over the sample period, that is, 80% of 
 
 
16. This compares with the findings from the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2003) of an average 
of 3.5% for German banks, 3.0% for American banks, and 
1.5% for Japanese banks. 
all issues. The dominance of these institutions is 
further emphasized by the fact that their issues 
represented 88% of the total value of SND issues 
over the sample period. Moreover, these six 
financial institutions were the only issuers to 
average at least two SND issues per year. The 
averages in Table A1 fail to illustrate that two 
smaller banks (Standard Chartered and North- 
ern Rock) have issued debt with some regularity 
during the period 1999 – 2002 and could, there- 
fore, be considered under an MSNDP. How- 
ever, institutions of similar size (Nationwide, 
Alliance  &  Leicester, and  Bradford  &  Bing- 
ley) have quite different issuing patterns, which 
suggests that the imposition of an MSNDP on 
either Standard Chartered or Northern Rock may 
put them at a competitive disadvantage during 
difficult trading conditions in the bond market 
(Table A2). 
The smaller institutions issue debt with such 
irregularity that it would be inappropriate to 
require  them  to  follow  an  MSNDP.  This  is 
in line with proposals by the U.S. Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) and 
Wall (1989) to exempt small banks from a 
mandatory debt requirement. Their infrequent 
issuance during the recent period of demand for 
corporate debt suggests that an MSNDP would 
impose excessive regulatory costs by causing 
them to significantly shift funding patterns away 
from the optimum. As a result, it appears that 
only the six largest credit institutions, which are 
all banks, would be appropriate for inclusion in 
an MSNDP in the United Kingdom. 
The high issuance numbers for the six largest 
banks could, however, be misleading because 
they have all been created from mergers and 
acquisitions over the sample period. Therefore, 
the average issues per year reflect the activities 
of more than one institution. Table A2 reveals 
far lower issuance activity when the analysis 
focuses on the constituents. Nevertheless, this 
does not detract from the fact that, going for- 
ward, only six UK banks are large enough to 
regularly issue SND and, therefore, be included 
in an MSNDP. An MSNDP requirement for at 
least four issues per year would also require 
these institutions to make smaller and more reg- 
ular issues. 
Table A2 indicates that the issuance activities 
of the six largest credit institutions fluctuated 
significantly over the sample period. This fluc- 
tuation appears to be related to debt market con- 
ditions; the highest issuance activity for all six 
institutions was during the period 1999 – 2002, 
 
 
 
when bond market conditions were favorable. 
During this period, these institutions made at 
least four issues per year. In contrast, the diffi- 
cult trading conditions of the early 1990s coin- 
cided with a period of low annual issuance when 
large credit institutions averaged only 1.3 issues 
per year. Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast (2000) 
and Calomiris and Powell (2001) suggest that 
riskier banks are less likely to issue SND, espe- 
cially during periods of banking stress. Although 
this article does not attempt to relate SND 
issuance activity to measures of bank risk, it 
is  clear  that  banks  are  less  likely  to  issue 
debt during periods of market and bank stress. 
Therefore, an MSNDP with a regular issuance 
requirement would force banks to issue debt 
during inopportune periods to enable the mar- 
ket to price bank risks through direct market 
discipline. 
 
 
B. Banks, Building Societies, and Conversion 
to Public Limited Company Status 
A significant and unique characteristic in the 
UK financial market has been the conversion 
of 10 building societies to banks over the past 
14  yr.  As  this  development has  affected  the 
data and its interpretation, this section investi- 
gates whether there are any special effects or 
Three converted credit institutions provide 
sufficient data to examine the trends and differ- 
ences in SND issues between building societies 
and banks. They are the Halifax, the Northern 
Rock, and the Alliance & Leicester, which all 
converted in 1997 (Table 13). To control for the 
effect of larger issuance sizes after 1998, data for 
the largest UK building society, the Nationwide, 
have been included in the table. 
It is interesting to note that all issues made 
when they were building societies were denomi- 
nated in sterling (and this is still true for Nation- 
wide), whereas, following conversion, the banks 
have made issues in euros, yen, and U.S. dol- 
lars. The number of perpetual issues has risen 
post conversion, but this is also true for the 
Nationwide, once again confirming the move 
toward perpetual issues by all UK credit institu- 
tions. Table 13 shows that issue sizes have also 
risen post conversion, but again, the rise in issue 
sizes at the Nationwide suggests that this is a 
country-specific trend. As a  result, it  appears 
 
 
TABLE 10 
UK Bank and Building Society SND Issues by 
Year 
 
Building 
trends that can be attributable to PLC conver-  Year 
Bank 
Issuesa 
Average/ 
Issuer 
Society 
Issuesa 
Average/ 
Issuer 
Total 
Issues 
sion.  Equally,  this  section  analyzes  the  SND    
issuance data for those institutions that have 
converted to see if there are any discerning 
trends. 
Table 10 supports the earlier discussion and 
reveals that banks have made the overwhelming 
number of issues. For example, the frequency 
of issuance by banks numbers around two per 
year, whereas building societies average about 
one per year. The decrease in building society 
issues  after  1997  reflects the  relatively  large 
number of PLC conversions; however, this hides 
the trend for smaller building societies to enter 
the  market  for  SND.  Accordingly,  Table 11 
shows how the number of issues by building 
societies that have not converted has risen in 
the past 4 yr. Continuing on the same theme, 
1985 15 (9) 1.66 0 (0) 0 15 
1986 10 (6) 1.66 0 (0) 0 10 
1987 4 (3) 1.33 0 (0) 0 4 
1988 14 (5) 2.80 9 (5) 1.8 23 
1989 9 (4) 2.25 4 (4) 1.00 13 
1990 3 (3) 1.00 3 (3) 1.00 6 
1991 5 (4) 1.25 4 (3) 1.33 9 
1992 7 (4) 1.75 6 (6) 1.00 13 
1993 15 (6) 2.50 9 (7) 1.29 24 
1994 12 (6) 2.00 2 (2) 1.00 14 
1995 17 (7) 2.43 1 (1) 1.00 18 
1996 19 (8) 2.38 7 (6) 1.12 26 
1997 12 (7) 1.71 5 (4) 1.25 17 
1998 14 (7) 2.00 1 (1) 1.00 15 
1999 49 (11) 4.45 5 (4) 1.25 54 
2000 43 (11) 3.91 4 (3) 1.33 47 
2001 36 (10b ) 3.6 3 (2) 1.5 39 
Table 12 illustrates the SND issuance activity by 
traditional banks, that is, those that were banks 
at the commencement of the sample period. This 
2002 
Total 
40 (8) 
324 
5.00 3 (3) 
66 
1.00 43 
390 
highlights that it is not just the conversion to 
PLC status that has raised the number of bank 
SND issues because it is clear that traditional 
banks have also raised their debt issuance since 
1999. 
a In parentheses is the number of different issuers during 
the year. 
b During this year, Bank of Scotland, Halifax PLC, and 
the merged entity HBOS PLC all issued SND. For the 
purposes of this table, this has been counted as involving 
only two issuers. 
 
 
 
TABLE 11 
SND Issues by Building Societies That Have Not Converted to PLC Status 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of Conversions 
to PLC Statusa 
 
Nonconverted 
Building Societiesb 
Total Issues by 
Building Societiesb 
(Table 9) 
 
1988 0 2 (1) 9 (5) 
1989 1 1 (1) 4 (4) 
1990 0 1 (1) 3 (3) 
1991 0 0 (0) 4 (3) 
1992 0 2 (2) 6 (6) 
1993 0 2 (1) 9 (7) 
1994 0 2 (2) 2 (2) 
1995 1 0 (0) 1 (1) 
1996 1 1 (1) 7 (6) 
1997 5 1 (1) 5 (4) 
1998 0 0 (0) 1 (1) 
1999 1 5 (4) 5 (4) 
2000 1 3 (2) 4 (3) 
2001 0 3 (2) 3 (2) 
2002 0 3 (3) 3 (3) 
Total 10 26 66 
 
a Including those building societies acquired by banks. 
b In parentheses is the number of different issuers during the year. 
Source: Bondware. 
 
that conversion is not creating any discernable 
changes in issuance characteristics, apart from a 
rise in non-sterling-denominated issuance. This 
probably  reflects  the  fact  that  building  soci- 
eties have some restrictions on their overseas 
operations. 
 
 
V.   IMPLICATIONS FOR MANDATORY SND 
PROPOSALS 
 
A. Scope of an MSNDP in the United Kingdom 
The evidence from Section III highlights sig- 
nificant issuer concentration in the market for 
UK SND. The largest seven institutions were 
responsible for 92% of the total value of SND 
issues over the sample period and had 90% of 
the outstanding SND on their books at the end of 
2002. To encourage sufficient investor monitor- 
ing and ensure that the level of SND is related to 
a bank’s risk profile, mandatory SND proposals 
(Table 1) suggest a level of outstanding SND of 
between 2% and 5% of RWA. The 10 largest 
banks in the United Kingdom all satisfy this 
condition, suggesting that SND already forms 
an integral portion of bank funding (Table A1). 
However, a key feature of an MSNDP is the 
requirement for regular issues of between two 
and four per year. Although eight banks have 
recently met this requirement, Tables A1 and A2 
indicate that only the six largest banks have met 
this requirement over the sample period. Nev- 
ertheless, it should be remembered that mergers 
and acquisitions have enabled these six insti- 
tutions to grow sufficiently to be able to meet 
this requirement. This suggests that it is only 
recently they have found themselves in a posi- 
tion to make sufficient regular calls on the mar- 
ket. It is also interesting to note that each of 
these six banks had assets in excess of $250 
billion at the end of 2002, whereas the seventh 
largest bank had an asset base that was less than 
half of that. Therefore, imposing an MSNDP 
exclusively on the six largest banks suggests that 
it will not significantly influence the competitive 
playing field within the UK banking industry, 
which is desirable, yet would cover around 85% 
of UK banking assets. 
 
 
B. How Often Should Banks Be Required to 
Issue SND? 
Issuance activity by UK credit institutions 
appears to reflect bond market conditions, bank 
profitability, and the general economic climate. 
In  addition,  the  type  of  SND  issued  varies 
with market conditions. The introduction of the 
Basel Accord appears to have had no identi- 
fiable impact because UK banks were already 
 
 
 
TABLE 12 
SND Issues by Banks That Were Classified as Banks as at January 1, 1985 
 
 
 
Year 
Total Issues by 
Banks as at 
January 1, 1985a Average/Issuer 
 
Total Issues by 
Banksa  (Table 9) 
 
1985 15 (9) 1.66 15 (9) 
1986 10 (6) 1.66 10 (6) 
1987 4 (3) 1.33 4 (3) 
1988 14 (5) 2.80 14 (5) 
1989 9 (4) 2.25 9 (4) 
1990 3 (3) 1.00 3 (3) 
1991 4 (3) 1.33 5 (4) 
1992 3 (3) 1.00 7 (4) 
1993 13 (5) 2.6 15 (6) 
1994 8 (5) 1.6 12 (6) 
1995 14 (6) 2.33 17 (7) 
1996 16 (7) 2.29 19 (8) 
1997 11 (6) 1.83 12 (7) 
1998 12 (6) 2.00 14 (7) 
1999 34 (8) 4.25 49 (11) 
2000 32 (7) 4.57 43 (11) 
2001 28 (6b ) 4.66 36 (10b ) 
2002 29 (5) 5.8 40 (8) 
Total 259  324 
 
a In parentheses is the number of different issuers during the year. 
b During this year, Bank of Scotland, Halifax PLC, and the merged entity HBOS PLC all issued SND. For the purposes 
of column 4, this has been counted as involving only two issuers and for the purposes of column 2 treated as only involving 
one issuer. 
Source: Bondware. 
 
satisfying similar capital adequacy requirements. 
Although  all  six  large  banks  issued  SND  at 
an  average  of  between  two  and  four  times 
a  year,  issuance  activity  varied  significantly 
over the sample period. The post-1999 era, for 
example, has witnessed a period of unprece- 
dented  issuance  activity  because  cheap  fund- 
ing could be obtained (between four and nine 
issues per year). However, this was previously 
offset by  a  period of  markedly reduced calls 
on the market, especially during the difficult 
trading conditions of 1989 – 1992 (between one 
and two issues per year). This suggests that 
requiring banks to issue three times per year 
may provide a suitable hurdle without imposing 
excessive regulatory costs. This would enable 
investors to regularly price bank risks into new 
SND issues and provide the regulatory author- 
ities with an additional insight into bank con- 
dition.  In  fact,  with  the  literature  beginning 
to question the quality of bank-specific infor- 
mation in debt prices (Delianedis and Geske, 
2001; Longstaff, 2002), maybe the informational 
power of an MSNDP lies in the quantity-based 
signals arising from whether banks can regularly 
issue SND. 
 
 
C. How Much Should Banks Be Required to 
Issue? 
As previously suggested, the largest UK 
banks would satisfy an MSNDP requirement for 
outstanding SND capital that lay between 2% 
and 5% percent of RWA. Looking at current 
SND levels (Table A1) and given the extremely 
large SND issues in the past 4 yr, it appears that 
an initial minimum of 2.5% of RWA is appro- 
priate. Over time, this could rise in steps up to 
a minimum 3.5%. This is in line with current 
voluntary SND amounts held on banks’ balance 
sheets. As such, it indicates that an MSNDP 
would not force banks to lever themselves above 
the unconstrained optimum and crowd out other 
funding sources. The extremely high levels of 
Tier 1 capital recorded by UK banks (Table A1) 
confirm that these voluntary SND amounts are in 
no way restricting equity sources of funding to 
the minimum. The average size of each issue is 
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in the region of $300 – $400 million, which com- 
pares favorably with U.S. findings of between 
$250 million and $400 million (Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000) and 
is larger than the EU average of $250 million 
(Sironi, 2001). As a result, each issue should be 
at least $300 million in value. 
 
 
D. What Form Should the SND Take? 
Section II indicates that the current issues of 
UK credit institutions are, primarily, fixed-rate 
perpetual debt. The long maturity of UK issues 
easily exceeds the extreme MSNDP requirement 
for debt with an initial maturity of 5 yr. How- 
ever, in line with most MSNDP proposals, it 
can be argued that the average initial maturity 
of UK SND, of 14 yr, is too long to provide 
suitable market discipline monitoring and sig- 
naling. EU and U.S. data indicate average SND 
maturities that also easily exceed 5 yr. There- 
fore, requiring banks to issue SND with a max- 
imum maturity of 5 yr will conflict with capital 
adequacy regulations17 and cause banks to alter 
funding strategies from the unconstrained opti- 
mum, and as a result, the maturity characteristic 
of MSNDP proposals should be reviewed. On 
the other hand, it is argued that capital adequacy 
regulations requiring banks to amortize debt by 
20% each year over the past 5 yr have encour- 
aged banks to issue debt with greater maturities. 
Therefore, if this requirement were removed, 
banks might issue shorter maturities. 
Other features associated with UK debt issues 
are that they typically have call features attached 
to them, which contrast with desired MSNDP 
characteristics (Evanoff and Wall, 2001). Also, 
the debt is almost always publicly issued, which 
raises the potential for both direct and indirect 
market discipline. Taking into account the large 
average issue size, this suggests that the sec- 
ondary market undoubtedly has the potential to 
be liquid. 
These SND characteristics contrast with the 
findings of  studies  on  the  U.S.  SND  market 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem, 2000) and the EU findings of Sironi (2001), 
where 10-yr maturity fixed-rate debt with non- 
callable features predominates.18 As a result, the 
harmonization of an international MSNDP may 
 
 
17. To tie in with capital adequacy requirements, a 
minimum initial maturity of 5 yr would be preferable. 
18. The UK’s unique preference for perpetual debt is an 
area for further research. 
 
 
 
prove more difficult than previously envisaged, 
even if the policy was restricted to the largest 
global  credit  institutions.  The  standardization 
of SND features is desirable because it would 
make it easier for market participants and the 
regulatory authorities to perform comparative 
analyses and to decipher the market signals of 
bank risk. 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has examined the main character- 
istics of UK credit institutions’ SND issues and 
assessed the implications with reference to the 
literature on the design of an MSNDP. Uniquely, 
the article has adopted a bank-level approach to 
investigate and explain particular nuances in the 
UK market for SND. 
The key findings can now be summarized. 
Although several banks and building societies 
issue SND, the market for UK credit institution 
SND is highly concentrated among the six 
largest banks. The typical bank SND is fixed- 
rate perpetual debt with call options attached, 
and banks typically have between 2% and 3% of 
outstanding debt to RWA. These characteristics 
differ significantly to EU and U.S. bank data, 
which record 10-yr, fixed-rate noncallable bonds 
as the most common type. Equally, in contrast 
to other EU countries, the introduction of the 
Basel Accord appears to have had little effect 
on the maturity characteristics of UK SND. 
The question posed by the article at the outset 
was should an MSNDP be introduced in the 
United Kingdom? The answer to this is framed 
around two policy considerations: domestic and 
international implementation of such a policy; 
and, given the costs, would an MSNDP enhance 
direct and/or indirect market discipline? 
At a domestic level, an MSNDP should be 
implemented  but  restricted  to  the  six  largest 
banks in the United Kingdom. A policy of at 
least three issues per year with at least 2.5% out- 
standing SND to RWA (rising to 3.5%) would 
not prove overly burdensome for these banks 
nor constrain alternative funding sources while 
at the same time enhancing quantity-based direct 
and indirect market discipline signals. Although 
the  largest  banks  are  currently  issuing  SND 
at a rate of more than three times per year, 
history  indicates  that  issuance  can  soon  dry 
up in difficult market and economic conditions 
unless a mandatory policy is in force. Further- 
more, as the six largest banks are significantly 
larger than the rest, imposing an MSNDP exclu- 
sively on them suggests that it will not influ- 
ence  the  competitive playing field within the 
UK banking industry. The large proportion of 
public issues raises the potential for a liquid sec- 
ondary market and hence suitable, price-based 
indirect market discipline. However, further 
research on this aspect of market discipline is 
necessary. 
MSNDP proposals suggest initial maturities 
on  qualifying  SND  of  no  more  than  5  yr. 
A concern is that UK credit institutions vol- 
untarily issue SND that easily exceeds this 
requirement. This is in part because of the 5-yr 
amortization rule in the Basel Capital Accord. 
The extremely long average maturity of UK 
SND suggests that initial maturities would still 
exceed 5 yr if the 5-yr amortization rule was 
scrapped. A standardized form of qualifying 
SND is essential in creating directly compa- 
rable securities for monitoring secondary mar- 
ket yields across issuers and over time. There- 
fore, a price-based indirect discipline MSNDP 
would force UK institutions to significantly alter 
their  debt  funding  mix  and  so  is  not  desir- 
able.  However,  standardizing  SND  maturities 
is  not  as  critical  in  implementing  quantity- 
based direct market discipline. Here, mandatory 
issuance becomes the overriding policy tool. If 
a bank is considered risky, then investors are 
unlikely  to  subscribe  funding,  unless  it  is  at 
a considerable above-peer average cost to the 
bank, and then, this is likely to become mar- 
ket news. Regular SND issuance would mean 
that  credit  institutions  are  frequently  scruti- 
nized by potential investors. Furthermore, the 
requirement that credit institutions make regular 
SND issues would prevent them from constantly 
issuing extremely long maturity debt to cover 
the 3.5% of RWA requirement because exist- 
ing investors would become uncomfortable at 
the rise in leverage ratios. Retaining the cur- 
rent Basel Capital Accord rules on qualifying 
SND would ensure that maturities of less than 
5 yr would be unlikely. Therefore, in the pres- 
ence of a direct market discipline policy that 
contains no maximum initial maturity require- 
ment, by default, institutions will continue to 
issue across the maturity spectrum. Further- 
more, as the article has shown, individual insti- 
tutions have a tendency to follow each other 
in issuing debt with similar maturities depend- 
ing on market conditions. For example, the 
period 1998 – 2002 has seen UK banks taking 
advantage  of  low  long  bond  yields  to  issue 
  
1 HSBC 
 
748, 890 
 
431, 805 
 
14, 831 
 
3.4 
 
57, 430 
 
26 
 
13.3 
 
9.0 
 
42 
 
2.3 
 
18, 621 
 
443.4 
2 Royal Bank of 649, 377 375, 812 12, 235 3.3 43, 970 28 11.7 7.3 74 4.1 29, 782 402.5 
 
3 Barclays 
 
637, 833 
 
279, 563 
 
7, 898 
 
2.8 
 
35, 784 
 
22 
 
12.8 
 
8.2 
 
55 
 
3.1 
 
19, 171 
 
348.6 
4 HBOS 512, 148 302, 631 9, 171 3.0 31, 474 29 10.4 7.9 51 2.8 15, 826 310.3 
5 Lloyds TSB 334, 288 197, 239 7, 530 3.8 18, 935 40 9.6 7.8 49 2.7 17, 811 363.5 
6 Abbey National 284, 107 126, 345 5, 617 4.4 14, 656 38 11.6 9.2 41 2.7 12, 876 314.0 
7 Standard  Chartered 113, 010 74, 434 3, 602 4.8 10, 793 33 14.5 8.6 14 0.8 5, 256 375.4 
8 Nationwide  BS 103, 963 N/A 736 N/A N/A N/A 11.7 9.6 9 0.6 1, 674 186.0 
9 Allian & Leicester 66, 485 32, 175 983 3.1 3, 668 27 11.4 8.5 7 0.5 1, 610 230.0 
10 Northern  Rock 52, 650 28, 025 1, 772 6.3 4, 512 39 16.1 9.3 15 1.0 3, 251 216.7 
11 Bradford  & Bingley 41, 442 21, 176 1, 092 5.2 3, 007 36 14.2 9.6 6 0.4 1, 296 216.0 
12 Britannia  BS 30, 096 N/A 399 N/A N/A N/A 14.3 11.2 4 0.3 573 143.3 
13 Yorkshire  BSa 20, 029 15, 725 100 0.6 1, 258 8 13.9 12.0 2 0.1 122 61.0 
14 Egg bank 17, 029 8, 023 325 4.1 1, 051 31 13.1 9.8 0 N/A N/A N/A 
15 Portman  BS 16, 719 N/A 130 N/A N/A N/A 13.3 N/A 2 0.1 197 98.5 
16 Co-operative  bank 14, 343 N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 14.1 10.6 4 0.2 435 108.8 
17 Coventry  BS 12, 988 N/A 35 N/A N/A N/A 12.7 11.1 1 0.1 22 22.0 
18 Standard  Life Bank 12, 577 N/A 230 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
19 Chelsea  BS 10, 813 N/A 130 N/A N/A N/A 16.3 N/A 3 0.2 224 74.7 
20 Skipton  BS 10, 808 N/A 57 N/A N/A N/A 12.3 10.3 2 0.1 41 20.5 
21 3i group 7, 827 N/A 51 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
22 Leeds & Holbeck 7, 814 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 13.2 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 
23 NM Rothschild 7, 269 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 0.1 387 193.5 
Others             
Cheshire  BS 4, 124 N/A 29 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.1 15 15.0 
Nottingham  BS 2, 921 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.1 36 36.0 
Scarborough  BS 2, 066 N/A 15 N/A N/A N/A 14 N/A 1 0.1 24 24.0 
Manchester  BS 557 N/A 4 N/A N/A N/A 6.9 N/A 1 0.1 8 8.0 
Hambros N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 0.2 36 18.0 
SG Warburg N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0.1 188 188.0 
Total 3, 722, 173  67, 090      390 21.7 129, 482 332.0 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 
SND Issues by the Largest UK Banks and Building Societies (by Total Assets) as at End of 2002 
 
Total 
 
Total RWA Outstanding  SND/RWA 
 
Regulatory 
 
SND/Regulatory Capital/Solvency 
 
No. of Issues  Amount ($m) 
Tier 1        
Institution Assets ($m) ($m) SND ($m) (%) Capital Capital (%) Ratio (%) Ratio (%) Total Average/Yr Total Average/Issue 
 
 
 
Scotland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: BS, building society; N/A, not applicable or not available. 
a As at end of 2001. 
Sources: Bankscope, Bondware, and company accounts. 
 H
A
M
A
LA
IN
EN
, H
O
W
C
R
O
FT &
 H
A
LL: SU
B
O
R
D
IN
ATED
 D
EB
T A
N
D
 U
K
 CR
ED
IT IN
STITU
TIO
N
S 
261 
 
TABLE A2 
SND Issues by the 11 Largest UK Banks and Building Societies (1985 – 2002) 
 
Number of Issues/Value ($m) per Period 
 
No. of Issues   Amount ($m) 1985 – 1988 1989 – 1992 1993 – 1998 1999 – 2002 
 
Average 
 
Average 
 
Average Value Average/ 
 
Average/  Value  Average/ 
 
Average/  Value  Average/ 
 
Average/  Value  Average/ 
Institution Total Yr Total Issue    No. /Yr ($m) Yr No. Yr ($m) Yr No. Yr ($m) Yr No. Yr ($m) Yr 
 
1 HSBC 34 1.9 16,289     479.1  3 0.8 1,053 263.3  1 0.3 809 202.3  14 2.3 4,385 730.8  16 4.0 10,041 2,510.3 
Midland Bank 8 1.1 2,332 291.5  6 1.5 2,190 547.5  2 0.5 142 47.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Total 42 2.3 18,621     443.4  9 2.3 3,243 810.8  3 0.8 951 237.8  14 2.3 4,385 730.8  16 4.0 10,041 2,510.3 
 
2 Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
 
44 2.4 17,565     399.2  3 0.8 768 192.0  1 0.3 250 62.5  13 2.2 2,940 490.0  27 6.8 13,607 3,401.8 
Natwest bank 30 2.0 12,217     407.2 9 2.3 3,329 832.3  8 2.0 2,506 626.5    4 0.7 1,960 326.7  9 2.3 4,421 4,421.0 
 
Total 74 4.1 29,782     402.5  12 3.0 4,097   1024.3  9 2.3 2,756 689.0  17 2.8 4,900 816.7  36 9.0 18,028 4,507.0 
 
3 Barclays 46 2.6 17,573     382.0  5 1.3 2,441 610.3  3 0.8 1,071 267.8  14 2.3 3,253 542.2  24 6.0 10,808 2,702.0 
Woolwich 9 0.8 1,598 177.6  0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.8 268 67.0    5 0.8 1,067 177.8  1 0.3 262 262.0 
 
Total 55 3.1 19,171     348.6  5 1.3 2,441 610.3  6 1.5 1,339 334.8  19 3.2 4,320 720.0  25 6.3 11,070 2,767.5 
 
4 HBOS 6 6.0 3,745     624.2      N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1.5 3,745 936.3 
Bank of Scotland Halifax 
+ Leeds Permanent BS 
+ Birmingham 
Midshires 
22 1.3 5,524     251.1  1 0.3 250 62.5  1 0.3 300 75.0  11 1.8 2,205 367.5  9 2.3 2,770 923.3 
 
 
23 1.6 6,557     285.1  5 1.3 816 816.0  2 0.5 254 63.5    8 1.3 2,310 385.0  8 2.0 3,177 1,059.0 
 
Total 51 2.8 15,826     310.3  6 1.5 1,066 266.5  3 0.8 554 138.5  19 3.2 4,515 752.5  23 5.8 9,692 2,423.0 
 
5 Lloyds TSB 29 4.1 12,572     433.5      N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1.0 1,997 665.7  23 5.8 10,575 2,643.8 
Cheltenham & 
Gloucester 
3 0.4 122 40.7  0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.8 122 30.5    0 0.0 0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lloyds Bank 15 1.4 4,782 318.8  9 2.3 2,917 729.3  0 0.0 0 0.0    6 1.0 1,865 621.7  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
TSB Bank   2 0.2  335 167.5   1 0.3  173   43.3  1 0.3 163 40.8    0 0.0  0  0.0 N/A N/A  N/A N/A 
Total 49 2.7 17,811     363.5  10 2.5 3,090 772.5  4 1.0 285 71.3  12 2.0 3,862 643.7   23  5.8 10,575 2,643.8 
6 Abbey National 40 2.2 12,694     317.4  0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.3 660 165.0  14 2.3 4,403 733.8  21 5.3 7,631 1,907.8 
National & Provincial   1 0.1  182 182.0  0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.3 182   45.5    0 0.0  0  0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total 41 2.7 12,876     314.0  0 0.0 0 0.0 6 1.5 842 210.5  14 2.3 4,403 733.8   21  5.3  7,631 1,907.8 
continued 
 
TA
BL
E 
A
2 
C
on
tin
ue
d 
 N
um
be
r 
of
 I
ss
ue
s/V
al
ue
 ($
m
) p
er
 p
er
io
d 
N
o.
 o
f I
ss
ue
s  
 A
m
ou
nt
 ($
m
) 
19
85
 – 
19
88
 
19
89
 – 
19
92
 
19
93
 – 
19
98
 
19
99
 – 
20
02
 
Av
er
ag
e 
Y
r 
Av
er
ag
e 
Is
su
e 
Av
er
ag
e 
Va
lu
e 
Av
er
ag
e/
 
Av
er
ag
e/
  V
al
ue
  A
ve
ra
ge
/ 
Av
er
ag
e/
  V
al
ue
  A
ve
ra
ge
/ 
Av
er
ag
e/
  V
al
ue
  A
ve
ra
ge
/ 
In
st
itu
tio
n 
To
ta
l 
To
ta
l 
N
o.
 
/Y
r 
($
m
) 
Y
r 
N
o.
 
Y
r 
($
m
) 
Y
r 
N
o.
 
Y
r 
($
m
) 
Y
r 
N
o.
 
Y
r 
($
m
) 
Y
r 
7 
St
an
da
rd
 C
ha
rte
re
d 
8 
N
at
io
nw
id
e 
B
S 
9 
A
lli
an
ce
 &
 L
ei
ce
st
er
 
10
 N
or
th
er
n 
R
oc
k 
11
 B
ra
df
or
d 
&
 B
in
gl
ey
 
14
 9 7 15
 6 
0.
8 
0.
6 
0.
5 
1.
0 
0.
4 
5,
25
6 
1,
67
4 
1,
61
0 
3,
25
1 
1,
29
6 
37
5.
4 
18
6.
0 
23
0.
0 
21
6.
7 
21
6.
0 
4 2 1 1 0 
1.
0 
2.
0 
1.
0 
1.
0 
0.
0 
1,
00
9 
34
5 84
 
70
 0 
25
2.
3 
86
.3
 
84
.2
 
17
.5
 
0.
0 
0 3 2 1 0 
0.
0 
0.
8 
0.
5 
0.
3 
0.
0 
0 
55
4 
59
3 40
 0 
0.
0 
13
8.
5 
14
8.
3 
10
.0
 
0.
0 
2 2 2 2 3 
0.
3 
0.
3 
0.
3 
0.
3 
0.
5 
35
3 
29
6 
41
9 
30
5 
56
2 
11
7.
7 
98
.7
 
13
9.
7 
10
1.
7 
18
7.
3 
8 2 2 11
 3 
2.
0 
0.
5 
0.
5 
2.
8 
0.
8 
3,
89
4 
47
9 
51
4 
2,
83
5 
73
5 
97
3.
5 
11
9.
8 
12
8.
5 
70
8.
8 
18
3.
8 
N
ot
e:
 B
S,
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
so
ci
et
y;
 N
/A
, n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
. 
So
ur
ce
: 
Bo
nd
w
ar
e.
 
 
 
an unprecedented amount of perpetual maturity 
debt. Therefore, investors will have the capacity 
to compare yields to similar recent issues and 
decide whether to refrain from investing or 
request a  higher yield. Again, if  funding can 
only be provided at a considerable above-peer 
average cost to the bank, then this is likely to 
become market news. 
Therefore, from a cost – benefit perspective, 
a UK MSNDP should be restricted to primary 
market direct discipline. Debt issuance compels 
disclosure to the market about an institution’s 
current condition and prospects. Regular calls 
on the debt market will provide mandatory SND 
investors with a significant governance mecha- 
nism, subjecting credit institutions to frequent 
monitoring and scrutiny and direct discipline 
signaling. Extending the policy to include indi- 
rect discipline through standardized mandatory 
SND would impose substantial funding con- 
straints on UK credit institutions and therefore 
should not be implemented. 
With globalization of banking activities and 
banking regulation becoming increasingly inter- 
national in scope, it is essential to consider the 
implementation of an MSNDP from an inter- 
national perspective. UK banks make relatively 
large issues, comparable in size with U.S. and 
EU banks. However, analyzing the market for 
SND at a bank level and purely focusing on one 
country provide evidence of SND characteris- 
tics unique to the United Kingdom. Therefore, 
the harmonization of standardized mandatory 
SND across countries may prove far more dif- 
ficult than articles such as Sironi (2001) envis- 
age. A global MSNDP would force some coun- 
tries’ banks to significantly alter their funding 
structures from the unconstrained optimum and 
so distort the international level playing field. 
Consistent  with  the  UK  policy  recommenda- 
tion developed above, maybe, country-specific 
direct discipline MSNDPs would be the most 
appropriate policy direction. National banking 
supervisors would set minimum issue sizes and 
minimum issue frequencies for their internation- 
ally active credit institutions. Again, a regular 
issuance requirement would be the key policy 
tool. Credit institutions could continue to issue 
debt appropriate to their market and circum- 
stances, but mandatory issuance would subject 
them to frequent monitoring and scrutiny and 
provide direct market discipline signals of bank 
condition to the national supervisory authorities. 
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